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Introduction 
This paper explores the emergence of new forms of urban segregation in contemporary 
Managua, Nicaragua. Although the country has historically always been characterised by high 
levels of socio-economic inequality – with the notable exception of the Sandinista 
revolutionary period (1979-90), when disparities declined markedly – the past decade in 
particular has seen the development of new processes of exclusion and differentiation, 
especially in urban areas. In many ways, these are part of a broader regional trend; as several 
recent studies have noted, many other Latin American cities are undergoing similar mutations. 
The seminal investigation in this regard is undoubtedly Teresa Caldeira’s City of Walls, which 
traces the way in which rising crime and insecurity have changed the cityscape of São Paulo, 
Brazil, transforming it from a space of open circulation to a fragmented archipelago of 
isolated “fortified enclaves”.1 This new urban morphology is most visible in the proliferation 
of self-sufficient gated communities and closed condominiums for the affluent, which have 
significantly altered the character of urban space as those on the ‘inside’ of the enclaves no 
longer relate to notions of spatial cohabitation with those on the ‘outside’, but rather to an 
ideal of separation from them.2 
In urban Nicaragua, the phenomenon has arguably gone further than simply enclaves. As I 
have detailed elsewhere, urban segregation has in fact developed through a process of 
‘disembedding’ rather than fragmentation.3 Partly because of the small size of the Managua 
elite, what has emerged instead of gated communities and closed condominiums is a ‘fortified 
network’, which has been constituted through the selective and purposeful construction of 
high speed roads connecting the spaces of the elites within the city: their homes, offices, 
clubs, bars, restaurants, shopping malls, and the international airport. The poor are excluded 
from these locations by private security, but also from the connecting roads, which are cruised 
at breakneck speeds by expensive 4x4 cars, and have no traffic lights but only roundabouts, 
meaning that those in cars avoid having to stop – and risk being carjacked – but those on foot 
risk their lives when they try to cross a road. The general picture, in other words, is one 
whereby a whole ‘layer’ of Managua’s urban fabric has been ‘ripped out’ of the fabric of the 
                                                
1 Teresa Caldeira, City of Walls: Crime, Segregation and Citizenship in Sao Paulo, Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2000. 
2 Similar processes have been observed in Buenos Aires (M. Svampa, Los que ganaron: La vida en los countries 
y barrios privados, Buenos Aires: Editorial Biblos, 2001), Mexico City (K. Fischer et al., ‘Transformación 
económica, políticas y producción de la segregación social en Chile y México’, Scripta Nova, VII(146[127]) 
(2003), at http://www.ub.es/geocrit/sn/sn-146(127).htm), Lima and Quito (A. Borsdorf, ‘Barrios cerrados en 
Santiago de Chile, Quito y Lima: Tendencias de la segregación socio-espacial en capitales andinas’, in L. F. 
Cabrales Barajas (ed.), Latinoamérica: Países abiertos, ciudades cerradas, Guadalajara: UNESCO & 
Universidad de Guadelajara, 2002), and Santiago de Chile (F. Sabatini & F. Arenas, ‘Entre el Estado y el 
mercado: Resonancias geográficas y sustentabilidad social en Santiago de Chile’, EURE,  26:79 (2000), pp.95-
113; R. Salcedo & A. Torres, ‘Gated communities in Santiago: Wall or frontier?’, International Journal of 
Urban and Regional Research, 28:1 (2004), pp.27-44), among others. 
3 D. Rodgers, ‘Disembedding the City: Crime, Insecurity, and Spatial Organisation in Managua, Nicaragua’, 
Environment and Urbanization, 16:2 (2004a), pp.113-124. 
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metropolis for the exclusive use of the city elites, thereby profoundly altering the cityscape 
and the relations between social groups within it. 
Such processes of segregation and exclusion are largely being driven by the affluent urban 
elites, both in Nicaragua and elsewhere in Latin America. This is obvious in the nature of the 
urban transformations themselves, but also becomes apparent when one “follow[s] the 
money”, as the Watergate mole ‘Deep Throat’ – a.k.a. Mark Felt – famously advised. 
Managua’s transformation coincided with the accession to power of Arnoldo Alemán, whose 
presidency between 1997 and 2001 came to epitomise the new oligarchy that emerged in 
Nicaragua from the ruins of the Sandinista revolution and the post-conflict peace process,4 
and to whose benefit the city’s mutations are clearly directed. The vast majority of the 
infrastructural changes to Managua’s cityscape were in fact financed from the Office of the 
Presidency – rather than the Managua municipality, which actually saw its budget 
significantly reduced – and were moreover among the few of Alemán’s actions that were 
uncontested by the Sandinista opposition, the upper ranks of which have themselves become 
part of the new oligarchy. Overall, several hundreds of millions of US dollars were spent on 
what can arguably be said to constitute an orchestrated top-down process of urban 
transformation that is primarily to the advantage of the city elites and not the impoverished 
majority of the population. 
While this top-down perspective is clearly critically important to consider, it also arguably 
constitutes something of a case of ‘elite-centrism’. I use the term ‘elite-centrism’ not because 
I think that contemporary analyses of urban segregation in Latin American cities favour elites 
– few of them do – but rather to point to the fact that such processes are generally always seen 
as flowing ‘from above’, and almost exclusively explored in relation to the fortified enclaves 
or networks of the elites. These, however, have an inevitable flipside in the form of 
concomitant ‘zones of exclusion’, where the vast majority of the excluded live and frequently 
eke out a living on limited resources. The dynamics of this “planet of slums” – to use Mike 
Davis’ evocative expression5 – are just as important to consider, as they are characterised by 
bottom-up processes that are also leading to critical urban mutations, including in particular 
the development of forms of what might be labelled “urban segregation from below”. This 
chapter presents a case study of such processes in a poor Managua neighbourhood called 
barrio Luis Fanor Hernández,6 drawing on ethnographic field research carried out in 1996-
1997 and 2002-2003.7 In particular, it explores how the emergence of a local drug economy in 
the late 1990s led to a process of profound socio-economic differentiation in the 
neighbourhood, fostering a range of different types of cultural and material exclusion. The 
paper describes these in detail and relates them to wider structural factors and processes, 
including a political economy of Nicaragua’s general economic predicament. 
 
                                                
4 See J. L. Rocha, ‘Microsalarios y megasalarios: Megadesigualdad y microdesarrollo’, Envío, 240 (March 
2002), pp.17-27. 
5 See M. Davis, ‘Planet of slums: Urban involution and the informal proletariat’, New Left Review, 26 (March-
April 2004), pp.5-24. 
6 A pseudonym, as are all the names of people mentioned in this chapter. Certain factual details have also been 
changed in order to protect the anonymity of the neighbourhood. 
7 The first period of fieldwork was carried out between July 1996 and July 1997 within the context of a social 
anthropology PhD programme at the University of Cambridge (D. Rodgers, Living in the Shadow of Death: 
Violence, Pandillas, and Social Disintegration in Contemporary Urban Nicaragua, unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Department of Social Anthropology, University of Cambridge, UK, 2000). The second period was 
conducted in February-March 2002 as part of the London School of Economics Crisis States Programme, which 
also sponsored a further visit in December 2002-January 2003. 
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Barrio Luis Fanor Hernández: Past and Present 
Barrio Luis Fanor Hernández is a low-income neighbourhood located in South-East 
Managua. It was founded in the early 1960s by squatters on what was then fallow farmland on 
the outskirts of Managua, and rapidly became informally known as La Sobrevivencia, due to 
the fact that it was reputedly one of the poorest neighbourhoods in the city where “people 
were always hungry and nobody did anything other than survive”, according to a long-time 
resident called Don Manuel. Following the Sandinista revolution in 1979, the neighbourhood 
benefited from the new regime’s urban reconstruction programme and was completely rebuilt 
in 1980-81. Under the supervision of government personnel, and with materials donated by 
the Cuban government, local inhabitants collectively built basic housing for themselves, as 
well as roads, paths, drains, and public spaces.8 This reconstruction programme called for 
follow-up maintenance by the state, however, and this never materialised, partly because 
public resources became increasingly diverted towards financing the costly civil war that 
affected the country from the mid-1980s onwards. The neighbourhood infrastructure rapidly 
began to decay, and by the time I first visited barrio Luis Fanor Hernández in 1996, the 
majority of houses were falling apart, and the neighbourhood infrastructure was highly 
deteriorated. Public spaces had been converted into rubbish dumps, cracks and potholes 
blemished roads and paths, and drains were blocked and no longer working.9 
This infrastructural decay was mirrored socio-economically. Although the neighbourhood was 
never well off by any stretch of the imagination during the 1980s, even after being 
reconstructed, the revolutionary regime ensured that at the very least nobody went hungry, 
through the general distribution of basic food rations to poor households. Following regime 
change in 1990, many barrio inhabitants felt that their living conditions declined, and indeed, 
by the mid-1990s, the situation had become so bad that many barrio residents were saying: 
“we’ve come full circle back to the time of La Sobrevivencia”. Certainly, according to a 
survey that I carried out in barrio Luis Fanor Hernández in November 1996, the 
neighbourhood unemployment rate was over 45 per cent, with a further 25 per cent of those 
economically active underemployed.10 There was little local economic enterprise in the 
neighbourhood apart from theft and delinquency, and there were moreover few opportunities 
outside the barrio either, especially for a labour force that tended to be unskilled. Most of 
those who worked did so in the informal sector, and the median monthly income was around 
700 córdobas (about US$85 at the time) – although many earned less. Not surprisingly, 
perhaps, the strains on the social fabric were such that it was no exaggeration to talk about a 
veritable ‘atomisation’ of social life.11 In spite of this social fragmentation, however, there 
was nevertheless a certain socio-economic uniformity to the barrio, with very few individuals 
or households being visibly better off than the rest. 
I expected little to have changed when I returned to barrio Luis Fanor Hernández in 2002 – 
considering that Nicaragua’s macro-economic situation had not improved – and it therefore 
                                                
8 On the Sandinista government’s urban reconstruction programme, see P. Drewe ‘Integrated upgrading of 
marginal areas in Managua’, Cities, 3:4 (1986), pp.333-349; and I. Vance ‘More than bricks and mortar: 
women’s participation in self-help housing in Managua, Nicaragua’, in C. Moser and L. Peake (eds), Women, 
Human Settlements and Housing, London: Tavistock Publications, 1985. 
9 In many ways, this situation was arguably worse than had the neighbourhood not been rebuilt, as cracked paths 
and drains made of concrete are more difficult to repair than dirt roads and hand-dug drainage ditches. 
10 The barrio had a population of approximately 3,000 inhabitants and was made up of 369 households. My 
survey sample was made up of 403 individuals in 50 households. 
11 See also Nitlapán-Envío team, ‘The crisis is bordering on the intolerable’, Envío in English, 167 (June 1995), 
pp.3-13; J.-C. Núñez, De la Ciudad al Barrio: Redes y Tejidos Urbanos en Guatemala, El Salvador y 
Nicaragua, Ciudad de Guatemala: Universidad Rafael Landívar/PROFASR, 1996. 
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came as a great surprise when one of the first things I observed on entering the neighbourhood 
were clear signs of significant economic improvement. Most obviously, much of what had 
been a relatively uniform neighbourhood of ramshackle, mainly wooden houses had been 
very visibly ameliorated, with many houses now made of brick and concrete, as well as 
having been expanded. Moreover, I counted over a dozen cars in the barrio streets as I walked 
into the neighbourhood – and subsequently recorded that there were a total of 72 cars in the 
barrio – most of which evidently belonged to the households in front of which they were 
parked. This was in striking contrast to five years previously when there had been just five 
car-owners in the neighbourhood. Finally, as I greeted old friends and acquaintances, it was 
immediately obvious that a significant number were dressed in better quality clothes than 
before, and many wore ostentatious gold jewellery, designer sunglasses, and some even had 
mobile telephones (and this in a neighbourhood where only a dozen households had had 
landlines in the mid-1990s). 
Although this was not what I had come to research – I had returned primarily to conduct a 
follow-up study to my previous investigations on gang violence in the neighbourhood12 – I 
straight away set about trying to find out what was fuelling this process of economic 
improvement. One immediately obvious fact was that the betterment was not universal. Many 
houses in the neighbourhood remained unchanged compared to five years previously, and 
moreover neither roads nor drains had been improved, public spaces continued to be rubbish 
dumps, and public lighting was still non-existent. As such, the source of the economic 
improvement was likely private rather than public. It was also a process that seemed to affect 
different parts of barrio Luis Fanor Hernández differently – there seemed to be more 
economic improvement in the “arriba” (Western) side of the neighbourhood than in the 
“abajo” (Eastern) side – and moreover also differently to surrounding neighbourhoods. 
Although there were signs of economic improvements in all of these, these were occurring on 
a lesser scale. This was particularly obvious from the perspective of housing: almost 60 
percent of houses in barrio Luis Fanor Hernandez had improved compared to the mid-1990s, 
but only about 20 percent bore any signs of major upgrading in surrounding neighbourhoods. 
 
Drugs, material wealth, and conspicuous consumption 
It quickly became apparent that there were actually three distinct processes contributing to the 
economic development and concomitant socio-economic differentiation visible in barrio Luis 
Fanor Hernández and surrounding neighbourhoods. Two of these seemed common to all, 
namely the increased sending of remittances by migrants abroad and the spread of credit 
facilities which allowed many with low incomes to buy cars and become taxi-owners.13 The 
third was drug trafficking, and this occurred in a particular way in barrio Luis Fanor 
Hernández, to the extent that there is little doubt that it constituted the key factor for the 
almost 40 percent difference in its infrastructural enhancement compared to surrounding 
neighbourhoods. Although there was some drug dealing in the neighbourhoods around barrio 
Luis Fanor Hernández, this happened on a very small scale. Indeed, the small time drug 
dealers that operated in surrounding neighbourhoods would generally come and buy their 
wares in barrio Luis Fanor Hernández, which by all accounts had become one of Managua’s 
principal drug distributing neighbourhoods, where drugs were brought in from outside the city 
and from where they were disseminated within. 
                                                
12 See Rodgers, 2000. 
13 See D. Rodgers, ‘La Globalización de un barrio ‘desde abajo’: Emigrantes, remesas, taxis, y drogas’, Envío, 
264 (March 2004b), pp.23-30. 
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Drug dealing was by no means new to barrio Luis Fanor Hernández. In the mid-1990s, 
marijuana had been sold in the neighbourhood, albeit only on a small-scale by two individuals 
who grew it themselves. Their main clients had been the local youth gang. By 2002, however, 
this artisanal trade had been completely superseded by a cocaine-based drug economy which 
principally involved the sale of crack, better known in Nicaragua as ‘la piedra’, or ‘the 
stone’.14 To a large extent this transformation is linked to broader international factors. Due to 
improved law enforcement efforts in the Caribbean, the late 1990s saw a diversification of 
drug trafficking routes from Colombia to North America, with flows along the Mexican-
Central American corridor increasing dramatically. Due to its proximity to the Colombian 
Caribbean island of San Andrés, Nicaragua is geographically a natural trans-shipment point 
along this route, but had been previously under-exploited because its transport infrastructure 
was generally very poor and traffic through the country was slight, making it difficult to slip 
drug shipments through unnoticed. In late 1998, however, Nicaragua was devastated by 
Hurricane Mitch, suffering major infrastructure damage and resource drainage. This 
negatively affected the already limited capabilities of local law enforcement institutions, 
thereby facilitating the importation of drugs. Furthermore, post-Mitch reconstruction efforts 
focused largely on rebuilding transport links, and improved these substantially, which had the 
knock-on effect of increasing the volume of traffic, which in turn made moving drug 
shipments easier. 
Drug trafficking in Central America tends to be a decentralised operation, with drug 
shipments being passed along a chain of relatively autonomous units, which all take a cut by 
making money distributing a share of the drugs locally. Cocaine consequently began to be 
traded in barrio Luis Fanor Hernández from the mid-1999 onwards, initially on a small-scale 
by just one individual but rapidly expanding into a three-tiered pyramidal drug economy by 
the first half of 2000. At the top of the pyramid was the ‘narco’ – also known as ‘el más 
grande’ (‘the biggest’) or ‘el poderoso’ (‘the powerful one’) – who brought cocaine into the 
neighbourhood ‘by the kilo’, according to several of my informants.15 The narco only 
wholesaled his goods, among others to the half a dozen ‘púsheres’ in the neighbourhood. 
Púsheres re-sold the cocaine they bought from the narco in smaller quantities or else ‘cooked’ 
it into crack which they then sold from their houses – ‘expendios’ – to a regular clientele 
which included ‘muleros’, the bottom rung of the drug dealing pyramid. Muleros sold crack in 
small doses to all-comers on barrio street corners, generally in the form of ‘paquetes’ costing 
10 córdobas (US$0.70) each and contained two ‘fixes’, known as ‘tuquitos’. 
In total, the barrio Luis Fanor Hernández drug pyramid directly involved 29 individuals: one 
narco, nine púsheres, and nineteen muleros. The narco, púsheres, and muleros all originated 
from the barrio, and interestingly, were all gang members or ex-gang members, or else linked 
to the latter. Sixteen of the nineteen muleros were members of the local youth gang – the 
‘pandilla’ – and the other three were ex-gang members. The narco was an ex-gang member 
from the early 1990s and all the púsheres were either ex-gang members from the mid-1990s 
or else partners of ex-gang members (all the muleros were males, as was the narco, but two of 
the púsheres were women). The narco and púsheres often hired people – generally members 
of their household – to help them out, but a large number of barrio inhabitants were also 
indirectly involved in the drug economy by acting as ‘bodegueros’, stashing drugs in their 
                                                
14 Cocaine is usually distributed either cocaine hydrochloride powder or as chunky nuggets – known as ‘crack’ – 
that are a mix of cocaine and sodium bicarbonate boiled in water. Crack is much less expensive than cocaine 
powder, and is known as ‘the poor man’s cocaine’. 
15 The narco originally came from Bluefields, which is the principal first trans-shipment point on mainland 
Nicaragua for drugs coming from Colombia via the island of San Andrés. He still had family there, and his 
supply networks were based on these. 
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houses for the narco or for púsheres in exchange of payment (the narco or púsheres spread 
their stocks of drugs in different places in order to keep only easily disposable quantities in 
their homes in case of a Police raid – although this was an extremely rare occurrence, and 
corrupt policemen would often provide tip-offs – but in this way they also involved other 
households in the trade and minimised the risk of denunciation). 
Bodegueros were generally paid between 200 and 1,000 córdobas (US$15-70) to stash drugs, 
depending on the quantity and the length of time they had to be stored, which constituted a 
substantial sum of money in a context where the median wage was about 1,500 córdobas 
(US$105). Those more directly involved in the drugs trade made much more, however. At the 
top of the pyramid, although the narco’s profits from drugs dealing were clearly very 
substantial, we are not talking about the multi-million sums associated with the drugs trade in 
the popular imagination. I have little specific information to offer about either the narco or the 
púsheres’ profits, but it was obvious from their consumption patterns that both made a 
sizeable profit. The former clearly made much more than the latter, however. The narco could 
afford two houses in the neighbourhood – where he maintained a wife and a mistress, as well 
as half a dozen children, in affluent style – one in a neighbouring barrio, another one in a 
richer part of the city, and he had built a new house for his parents who were living in the 
neighbourhood. He moreover owned a fleet of eight taxis, as well as two more cars for his 
own personal use, and a couple of large motorcycles. Furthermore, the narco also regularly 
bestowed favours onto his immediate neighbours by distributing free food and lending them 
money interest-free or at a reduced rate compared to market prices. 
The púsheres publicly flaunted their wealth by building gaudy, ostentatious houses frequently 
painted in bright colours – yellow, spearmint green, pink – which more often than not had 
extravagant fittings – in one case, crystal chandeliers (hanging from a corrugated iron roof) – 
and exotic furniture such as rococo full length mirrors, as well as luxurious home appliances 
such as wide screen televisions, mega-wattage sound systems, and Nintendo game consoles. 
Almost all owned at least one car, and some had two homes, one to live in and one to sell 
their drugs from. Púsheres also often wore obviously expensive brand-name clothes – 
Lacoste, Polo Ralph Lauren, Benetton – gold jewellery and luxury watches, and made a point 
of drinking costly drinks such as whisky instead of rum, smoked foreign brand cigarettes, and 
shopped in Managua’s two supermarkets rather than in the markets, thereby differentiating 
themselves from the rest of the barrio population. Interestingly, the narco somewhat 
paradoxically cut a rather shabby figure in comparison to the púsheres. He generally dressed 
down, and rarely wore gold jewellery or other items of obvious luxury. He however 
frequently flaunted his wealth in other ways. While neither of his houses in the 
neighbourhood were as ostentatious as those of púsheres, both the one he built for his parents 
and the one he had in the neighbouring barrio were two-storey buildings – a rarity in barrio 
Luis Fanor Hernández and indeed in Managua more generally. Furthermore, the narco also 
would also regularly drive through the neighbourhood on one of his motorcycles, notoriously 
accosting passing women – whether single or not – and offering them substantial sums of 
money to sleep with him, thereby signalling his power and impunity within the strictures of 
machismo that frame so much of social life in contemporary Nicaragua.16  
Although the narco and the púsheres obviously moved greater quantities of drugs, even at the 
lowest level of the drug dealing pyramid, the muleros, the rewards were potentially 
substantial. Muleros bought crack from púsheres in the form of tucos, nuggets about the size 
                                                
16 See R. Montoya, ‘House, street, collective: Revolutionary geographies and gender transformation in 
Nicaragua, 1979–99’, Latin American Research Review, 38:2 (June 2003), pp.61-93. 
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of the first phalange of the thumb, for 500 córdobas (US$36) each. They would then cut 
(‘picar’) the tucos into tuquitos – each tuquito was about 2mm by 2mm in size, with a 
variable weight of 1/10 to 1/2 gram – which they would then wrap in aluminium foil, and put 
into paquetes of two. Each paquete was sold for a standard price of 10 córdobas (US$0.70). 
On average, a mulero would sell 40-50 paquetes a day, with peaks of 80-100 paquetes on 
Fridays and Saturdays, and lows of 10-20 on Sundays.17 Each tuco bought for 500 córdobas 
would yield between 160-190 tuquitos, depending on the mulero’s cutting skills and also how 
much he kept for his own consumption. This in turn corresponded to 80-95 paquetes, which 
sold at 10 córdobas each meant that the profit on each 500 córdobas outlay was between 300-
450 córdobas (US$22-32), although 12 córdobas have to be discounted for a roll of 
aluminium foil, and a further 5 córdobas for the small plastic bags in which muleros put the 
tuquitos. 
In other words, at the bottom of the drug-dealing pyramid, a mulero could make between 
5,000-8,500 córdobas (US$350-600) profit per month, equivalent to between three to five 
times the average Nicaraguan wage; as such, it can be contended that such low level drug 
dealing constituted one of the most profitable economic opportunities available to youth at the 
local level. Like the púsheres, albeit more modestly, the muleros generally sported good 
quality clothes – often global brand names such as Nike, for example – as well as gold chains, 
rings, and also walkmans and portable CD players. They would in addition spend 
considerable amounts of money on cigarettes and alcohol, although generally local brands 
only rather than foreign goods like the púsheres. At the same time, however, similarly to the 
púsheres, the muleros devoted substantial proportions of their wealth to improving the 
material conditions of their households, but also of those of their extended families in the 
barrio. In a neighbourhood that was over 40 years old, this meant that the trappings of drug-
fuelled economic development extended far beyond just those directly involved in the 
trafficking, to the extent that from a nucleus of about 30 individuals up to 40 percent more 
households in barrio Luis Fanor Hernández were visibly better off than in non-drug dealing 
neighbourhoods. For those who did not fall in the 60 percent of neighbourhood households 
that were better off, however, life seemed to continue much as it had in the mid-1990s. 
 
Consumption, cultural exclusion, and predation 
In a recent article describing how the illegal drugs trade affected and transformed the rural 
small-town community of Buenavista in central highlands Mexico, James McDonald argues 
that a drug economy can be: 
a powerful source of cultural as well as economic change through the routinised 
forms of everyday cultural practice that lead to transformations of existing 
activity, organization, and identity.18  
In particular, McDonald contends that the cultural routinisation of the drugs trade in 
Buenavista – as reflected in the proliferation of particular architectural forms (opulent 
housing), the presence of luxury commodities (expensive cars and designer clothes), and the 
adoption of non-tradition patterns of consumption (high stake betting at cockfights) – has 
                                                
17 A significant proportion of clients were local barrio inhabitants, but the vast majority came from outside the 
neighbourhood, and included both rich and poor Nicaraguans, as well as a trickle of foreigners. Most clients 
came after nightfall, although a substantial number came during the day, and there was a definite predominance 
of men over women. 
18 James McDonald, ‘The narcoeconomy and small-town, rural Mexico’, Human Organization, 64:2 (2005), 
p.120. 
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generated inequalities that go beyond simple quantitative differences in material wealth. 
Drawing on Appadurai,19 he maintains that although consumption is obviously an important 
economic process, it is even more critical as a cultural practice through which people 
constitute and define themselves as social beings, and that – implicitly arguing that they 
constitute a class of ‘cultural entrepreneurs’ – the emergent drug dealing elite in Buenavista 
and their new patterns of consumption have become the primary source of symbolic 
inspiration for the construction of local identities in the community, thereby reshaping it “in 
subtle and not so subtle ways”.20 
The obvious in these changes are the adoption of new consumer practices by local community 
members not involved in the drugs trade, more and more of whom seek to adopt the trappings 
of a drug trafficking lifestyle that is seen to epitomise the apex of social accomplishment, for 
example buying what they can in the way of designer clothes and sartorially imitating drug 
dealers. But what these signal at a less apparent underlying level are fundamental 
transformations of what can be termed – after Charles Taylor – the “local social imaginary”.21 
The new consumption patterns of the drug dealing elite alter notions of what it is to imagine 
and to be a member of the community, and this leads to what McDonald refers to as 
“slippage”.22 The drug dealing elite and non-drug dealing members of the local community 
enter into acts and rituals of consumption differently, and find themselves as a result starkly 
distinguished from one another. Although both groups imagine their identities through the 
same forms of consumption, only the former can actually afford them, meaning that the latter 
are constantly reminded of what they lack, and end up feeling an acute sense of relative 
deprivation, or put another way, find themselves culturally excluded. From this perspective, 
the rise of the drugs trade and the associated conspicuous consumption patterns of drug 
dealers can be said to generate powerful forms of social disjuncture within the local 
community that go far beyond the solely material. 
Such an analysis is very attractive when one considers Thorstein Veblen’s original 
characterisation of the notion of “conspicuous consumption”, where he maintains that it is a 
process that revolves primarily around socio-cultural differentiation rather than material 
wealth. Indeed, Veblen actually argues that “the beginning of a differentiation in consumption 
even antedates the appearance of anything that can fairly be called pecuniary strength”.23 
There is evidence to suggest that this is perhaps true in the case of barrio Luis Fanor 
Hernández, where the drugs trade was intimately associated with the local gang. Certainly, the 
gang in the 1990s had constituted a locus of particular social practices such as binge drinking, 
smoking marijuana, and wearing Nike shoes that could arguably be seen as progenitorial to 
contemporary forms of conspicuous consumption, although it should be noted that gang 
members were far from being in any way wealthy.24 Moreover, the better off part of barrio 
Luis Fanor Hernández – the ‘arriba’ side – corresponded spatially more or less exactly to 
what had been in the mid-1990s the territory of the age-cohort of the gang that became the 
nucleus of the gang in 2002. At the same time, this association is perhaps most interesting to 
consider when thought about in light of Veblen’s claim that differentiation is ultimately 
                                                
19A. Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization, Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1996. 
20 McDonald (2005), p.117. 
21 Charles Taylor, ‘Modern social imaginaries’, Public Culture, 14:1 (2002), pp.91-124. 
22 McDonald (2005), p.118. 
23 T. Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study of Institutions, New York: Macmillan, 1902, 
p.68. 
24 See D. Rodgers, ‘Living in the shadow of death: Gangs, violence, and social order in urban Nicaragua, 1996-
2002’, Journal of Latin American Studies, 38:2 (forthcoming, February 2006). 
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traceable back to what he calls “predatory culture”. From this perspective, the political 
economy of the violence that surrounds the drugs trade in barrio Luis Fanor Hernández 
becomes particularly significant. 
 
Violence and primitive accumulation 
By all accounts the neighbourhood had become a much more violent place since the 
development of a drug economy. To a certain extent, this was due to the neurological effects 
of crack consumption. Crack enhances aggressiveness, and makes individuals less 
predictable. As a barrio inhabitant called Adilia explained to me: 
The problem is that now, anybody could be a potential danger, if they’ve smoked 
some crack, any time… you can’t know what they’re going to do, with this drug 
people become more violent, more aggressive, they don’t care about anything, 
they don’t recognise you... you don’t know what they’re thinking or even if 
they’re thinking at all, they could just kill you like that, without a thought. 
 
Everybody I talked to in barrio Luis Fanor Hernández told me without exception that 
insecurity had worsened since the emergence of crack, and in particular that there had been an 
increase in brutal robberies, assaults, and common delinquency. This was certainly supported 
by my observations of everyday barrio life during my return visit in 2002, when it was 
apparent that there were more acts of spontaneous, unpredictable violence occurring on a 
daily basis than compared to the mid-1990s. These were indeed more often than not linked to 
crack consumption. It was extremely frequent to see drugged up gang members stopping 
neighbourhood inhabitants in the streets of the barrio and asking for a few córdobas to buy 
another fix. If their request was refused or ignored, they would frequently become violent, 
lashing out with a fist, pulling out a knife, or wildly swinging a machete. Indeed, weapons 
such as knives and machetes, but also guns – I witnessed four shoot-outs during the course of 
two months in the barrio in 2002 – were used much more frequently than in the past, and 
often openly carried about, which had not been the case previously. 
At the same time, although crack consumption was clearly important in explaining these 
increased levels of violence and insecurity, it can also be argued that these were to a larger 
extent a consequence of the nature of the drugs trade itself. A drug economy cannot rely on 
formal mechanisms of regulation and contract-enforcement such as the law due to the fact that 
drugs are illicit goods. Alternative informal mechanisms are necessary in order to impose 
regularity onto drug transactions, and as has widely been pointed out within the social 
sciences, perhaps the most basic form of social regulation is achieved through the use and 
threat of violence. Seen in this way, it was no accident that the drugs trade became dominated 
by members or ex-members of the local gang. Indeed, in many ways it can in fact be argued 
that there existed something of a ‘contingent compatibility’ between the gang and the drugs 
trade.25 As a small, tightly-knit group that was the dominant source of violence in the 
neighbourhood – to the extent that it held a quasi-monopoly over public forms of brutality and 
fundamentally organised local level social life in the barrio as a result – the gang was well 
placed to provide the brutal forms of informal regulation required for sustainable drug 
trafficking when drugs first arrived in the neighbourhood. 
                                                
25 See D. Rodgers, ‘When vigilantes turn bad: Gangs, violence, and social change in urban Nicaragua’, in D. 
Pratten and A. Sen (eds), Global Vigilantes: Anthropology, Violence, and Community in the Contemporary 
World, London: C. Hurst & Co. publishers, forthcoming. 
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Although mulero gang members conducted their drug dealing on an individual basis, the gang 
as a group acted in a coordinated manner to ensure the proper functioning and protection of 
the barrio drug economy, providing security services to the narco and to the púsheres, and 
making certain that transactions proceeded smoothly. Gang members would enforce contracts, 
roughing up recalcitrant clients, as well as guarding drug shipments as they were moved in 
and out of the barrio. They would also make sure that clients could enter the neighbourhood 
unmolested by either the local population or outsiders. Neighbourhood inhabitants, however, 
lived under a veritable regime of terror. Gang members would strut about the streets, 
menacingly displaying their guns and machetes, repeatedly warning barrio inhabitants of the 
potential retribution that would befall them if they denounced them or others involved in the 
drugs trade, and backing these threats with violence. On one occasion in March 2002, the 
gang beat up the son of an elderly neighbourhood inhabitant who lived next to a púsher, as a 
warning after she had harangued and thrown a bucket of water on crack buyers who had 
knocked on her door by mistake late one night. 
Seen in this light, the intimate relationship between violence and drug trafficking in barrio 
Luis Fanor Hernández potentially points to the latter being a process that bears comparison 
with Karl Marx’s famous notion of ‘primitive accumulation’.26 According to Marx, capitalism 
was at its most basic founded upon a unique social relationship between two opposing but 
inescapably linked social groups: on the one hand a class of capitalists with a virtual 
monopoly over the means of production, and on the other hand, a property-less proletariat that 
had been dispossessed of their means of production and subsistence, and consequently had 
only their labour as a resource. The necessary precondition for capitalist development was 
therefore the differentiation of society into these two social classes, and ‘primitive 
accumulation’ was the expression Marx used to designate the means through which this 
differentiation occurred. This generally involved the burgeoning capitalist class violently 
dispossessing embryonic proletarians of their means of production in order to be able to 
exploit the labour that they are then subsequently forced to sell in order to survive. The 
analogy with the barrio Luis Fanor Hernández drug economy is not perfect because the drug 
dealing elite was not exploiting the local population in the way Marx envisioned capitalists 
exploiting the proletariat. It is nevertheless worth thinking about in view of the extensive 
process of socio-economic differentiation that occurred in the barrio due to the drugs trade, 
and the fact that – following McDonald – drug trafficking can be seen as transforming the 
basis of consumption-based local social imaginaries in a way that amounts to a form of 
symbolic dispossession.27 The larger question such an analysis brings up, however, is why 
such a process of ‘primitive accumulation’ would occur in a neighbourhood like barrio Luis 
Fanor Hernández, which is theoretically already integrated within the wider Nicaraguan 
economy. 
In this respect, it is illuminating to turn to Mike Davis’ recent work on ‘urban involution’ and 
the rise of an informal global proletariat, where he describes the way in which most cities are 
now principally made up of slums populated by a vast underclass that is increasingly excluded 
from contemporary production processes and left to survive by its own devices. These are the 
inevitable flipside of the existence of “fortified enclaves”, where the affluent have decided to 
live in “splendid isolation”, and constitute “a fully franchised solution to the problem of 
warehousing the twenty-first century’s surplus humanity” in an age of technology and 
information-based economies. Davis goes on to ask the obvious question of whether these 
                                                
26 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, translated by Ben Fowkes and introduced by Ernest 
Mandel, London: Penguin, 1976. I am grateful to Jo Beall for pointing out this out to me. 
27 McDonald (2005). 
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“slums of exclusion” are not “volcanoes waiting to erupt”, and suggests that a range of 
responses are potentially possible, from the emergence of “some new, unexpected historical 
subject” that will challenge the process of urban segregation that has been imposed from 
above to “ruthless Darwinian competition” within the slums, “as increasing numbers of poor 
people compete for the same informal scraps, ensur[ing] self-consuming communal violence 
as yet the highest form of urban involution”.28 
What the case study presented in this paper suggests is that it is the latter option that seems to 
emerge. The processes in barrio Luis Fanor Hernández described above have to be situated 
within the larger context of the top-down process of urban segregation that has occurred in 
Managua.29 The process of ‘disembedding’ of the city has not only separated an autonomous 
‘layer’ of the metropolis for the rich, but has also created large ‘zones of exclusion’ where the 
impoverished city masses attempt to survive as best they can. A Hobbesian social order has 
arguably emerged within these zones, where the principal concern of those inhabiting them is 
material survival, and only the strongest and fittest can attempt to establish means of 
enrichment that go beyond mere subsistence, for example through violent economic practices 
such as drug trafficking (indeed, this is perhaps a particularly appropriate way of 
conceptualising drugs trafficking considering that it is a paradigmatic form of ‘savage’ 
capitalism – something that also makes the link to a putative process of ‘primitive 
accumulation’ all the more attractive). From this perspective, the drugs trade in barrio Luis 
Fanor Hernández constitutes an attempt to create a form of economic organisation that goes 
beyond mere survival in a context of rampant poverty and enforced isolation from the wider 
social unit of the city. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has explored what might be termed forms of ‘urban segregation from below’. 
Drawing on a case study of a poor Managua neighbourhood called barrio Luis Fanor 
Hernández, I focused on the way in which the emergence of a local drug economy led to 
significant forms of socio-economic differentiation, which were particularly well reflected in 
the new conspicuous consumption of drug dealers that have changed local cosmologies and 
symbolic frameworks. As important as consumption behaviour may be, however, as Frances 
Rothstein points out – citing Mary Douglas and Baron Isherwood – “consumption has to be 
set back into the social process”.30 Although differentiation can be elaborated through 
consumption, it is ultimately created outside consumption, and therefore “consumption 
practices must be viewed in terms of class, political economy and material reality”.31 In this 
regard, it is illuminating to consider the process of micro-level social differentiation and 
economic development that I observed in barrio Luis Fanor Hernández through the lens of 
Karl Marx’s notion of ‘primitive accumulation’, the primary characteristic of which is the 
violent separation of society into capitalists and proletariat, through the former dispossessing 
the latter of their means of production. Although the analogy is not perfect, it allows us to 
think more broadly about why the drugs trade has emerged at the micro-level in urban 
Nicaragua, in essence as an attempt to establish a viable form of economic livelihood that 
goes beyond mere subsistence. 
                                                
28 Davis (2004), p.28. See also M. Davis, Planet of Slums, London: Verso, forthcoming 2006. 
29 See Rodgers (2004a). 
30 F. A. Rothstein, ‘Challenging Consumption Theory: Production and Consumption in Central Mexico’, 
Critique of Anthropology, 25:3 (2005), p.298; Mary Douglas & Baron Isherwood, The World of Goods: Towards  
Anthropology of Consumption, Boston: Basic Books, 1979, p.4. 
31 Rothstein (2005), p.283. 
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 In many ways, the emergence of such desperate forms of micro-level economic 
organisation is not surprising considering Nicaragua’s macro-economic predicament, which 
according to William I. Robinson can be labelled a state of “mal-development”.32 Certainly, 
the country has been caught in a vicious cycle of economic stagnation, suffering severe and 
increasing disequilibria relative the global economy. The economy is structurally constrained 
given its import and export structure, imports having a high inelasticity of demand, while 
exports have a high elasticity of demand. Traditional export sectors are moreover increasingly 
uncompetitive in a hemispheric context where there are few possibilities for the development 
of new export sectors (all the more so following the Central American Free Trade 
Agreement). To this extent, it can be contended that poor Nicaraguans – because the country’s 
elite is to a large extent transnational in its economic foundations, and controls the few 
national resources there are – have few options other than to develop non-traditional forms of 
capital accumulation such as drug trafficking if they are to achieve any form of ‘development’ 
that goes beyond simple survival. However, whether such strategies will lead to more 
extensive forms of economic development in the same way Marx envisaged ‘primitive 
accumulation’ giving rise to capitalism remains to be seen. 
 
                                                
32 William I. Robinson‘(Mal)development in Central America: Globalization and Social Change’, Development 
and Change,  29:3 (1998), pp.467-497. 
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